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Most economists believe that outsourcing will lead to
prosperity for both the United States and poor
nations. This economic theorist has doubts. Based on
the law of one price, he believes that the U.S.
economy might be in for a rough ride.
T
HE VIEW ABOUT OUTSOURCING that one normally hears from econo-
mists is “Not to worry”—outsourcing is just another form of
trade. Since trade has benefited, not hurt, the United States in
the past, we should not worry, the market will take care of us. Al-
though outsourcing hurts some people, the large majority of the popu-
lation benefits.  That position shows much insight and truth, but I
am not so sanguine about what is currently occurring. In my view, it
is suggestive that the United States is now, or will be in the next
decade, likely to enter into a period of long-run relative structural
decline, which will be marked by economic malaise and a continued
loss of good jobs. These are long-run predictions—it is the general
trend of the U.S. economy. Economic theory has little to say about
shorter-run issues.The Long-Run Consequences of Trade and Outsourcing
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I base my long-run prediction on the law of one price, a central law
of economics. It can be easily stated: “Equal goods” will eventually
sell for the same price and “equal factors” will eventually receive
equal pay. Since “equal goods” and “equal factors” are ambiguous
concepts, there is a certain degree of interpretation in this economic
law, which is why economists can come to different positions in
making their interpretations.
For example, the law of comparative advantage (the law that econo-
mists normally refer to when discussing the implications of trade) is
based on the law of one price, but in its normal interpretation it as-
sumes highly limited capital, social/institutional, and technological
transferability. When David Ricardo first fully articulated this law in
the early 1800s, those assumptions were probably reasonable; today
they are less so. Technological changes have made each of those as-
sumptions questionable, especially if one is considering long-run ten-
dencies, as I am here. In the intermediate run, technology will transfer
from one country to another, undermining any technology-dependent
comparative advantage that a country has. Similarly with institutions:
If, in the long run, one country’s institutions work better than another’s,
other countries will adapt their institutions to integrate the better-work-
ing ones, as China and India recently did when they modified their
institutions by adopting more market-oriented systems. Although the
process of institutional adjustment is slow, it does occur, and, as it
does, it undermines whatever social/institutional dependent compara-
tive advantage a country may have had.
In the long run, when capital, social institutions, and technology
are fully mobile and not impeded, then the law of one price works
fully on wages. It states that workers of equal ability will ultimately
receive equal pay. To the degree that they do not, forces will be set in
motion to see that eventually they do. I emphasize the “eventually,”
because in the short run, and even the intermediate run, the forces of
competition and arbitrage upon which the law is based can be over-
whelmed by institutional factors. These factors, along with geographi-
cally centered dynamic effects, can push an economy in the opposite
direction, giving people a belief that the law of one price has beenColander
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repealed. That is what happened in the late 1990s’ New Economy
period. That period was, in my view, an outlier.
What we’re now seeing with the jobless recovery is, in my view, a
better indication of things to come. The reason is that the businesses
I talk to consider Chinese workers—and, to a lesser degree, workers in
a variety of other developing countries—the equivalent of U.S. work-
ers, and that view, combined with the law of one price, will create
strong pressures for real-wage equalization. The standard economic
answer to this argument is that education will save us—that since U.S.
workers are better educated than foreign workers, they can earn a
significant premium. I am not so sure. The businesspeople I talk to
are less concerned with specific years of school than they are with
attitude, ability to adapt to new ways of doing things, reliability, and
job-specific training, all of which are not necessarily reflected in in-
dexes of education based on years of formal schooling. Businesspeople
today believe that there are significant numbers of appropriately
trained individuals in China, India, and other developing countries,
so education is not a major differentiating factor. Even if it is par-
tially true that U.S. workers have an edge in education, educational
differences cannot support the enormous wage differentials that cur-
rently exist internationally.
There are, of course, a number of provisos. The workings of the
law of one price depend enormously on the transferability of tech-
nological and institutional environment and capital. But again, based
on my discussions with businesspeople, transferability of each of
these in the long run seems a reasonable assumption. It is true that
U.S. firms, because of political issues, limit the amount of produc-
tion performed outside the United States. But firms also feel pres-
sure to base production outside the country because they believe
that if they do not, they will be left out of the Chinese market, and
that firms based in other countries will have a head start in the ex-
panding Chinese market, leaving U.S. firms unable to compete. So,
assuming the political and social system in China or other major
emerging economies remains stable, we can expect outsourcing to
increase significantly over the coming decades, as the law of oneThe Long-Run Consequences of Trade and Outsourcing
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price works its way through the world economy. As this happens,
the technological and capital differences between the United States
and China will become smaller and smaller, making the equilib-
rium difference between U.S. and Chinese wages less and less. (I use
China to simplify the discussion. There are numerous other coun-
tries out there that will be exerting the same pressure on various
levels of U.S. business and jobs.)
While there are lots of “ifs,” “ands,” and “buts” involved, the law
of one price means that for the United States to maintain its standard
of living over the coming decades, it must do so within an overall
structural setting in which simultaneously the law of one price is
exerting forces to bring a labor force at least ten times its size up to
its wage level. Chinese workers who currently get 60 cents an hour
must be brought into parity with U.S. workers currently getting $12
an hour. Assuming average Chinese real wages grow at 6 percent a
year in U.S. dollars, this means that U.S. real wages can rise by about
1 percent a year if the equalization occurs over a fifty-year period.
The slower the growth in Chinese wages, or the faster the equaliza-
tion, the slower the possible growth of the real wage in the United
States that is compatible with eventual factor price equalization. Until
that equalization happens, the law of one price will continue to be
sucking away at U.S. jobs and U.S. production, a sucking that will
likely slow U.S. growth and cause economic malaise in the United
States for decades.
The “optimist” argument against this view, as I understand it, is
inductive. It says: “Look, this process has been going on for a long
time, and it has helped us, not hurt us, so why should the future be
any different? Trade is not a zero sum gain; it creates additional jobs.
As you lose comparative advantage in one area, you gain it in the
other. That’s Principles of Economics 101. So while the United States
will lose jobs through outsourcing, it will gain high-level jobs pro-
ducing sophisticated products through an expansion in trade.” Ac-
cording to this view, the new movement of service jobs is just another
form of trade. (Although if you’re a chairman of the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers, you had better be careful in making the argument.)Colander
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Having had Econ. 101, and having written an Econ. 101 text, I un-
derstand this argument, but understanding it does not alleviate my
basic pessimism. My problem is that the law of one price applies to
high-level jobs producing sophisticated products just as it does to
low-level jobs. Until the wage equalization occurs, we can expect pres-
sure on all jobs and production facilities. When thinking inductively
about the implications of trade for an area, my thoughts move to the
experience in my upstate New York hometown of Jamestown. Over
the past fifty years. Jamestown has fallen upon hard times. Its popu-
lation has declined by almost 50 percent, and it has experienced eco-
nomic malaise as the law of one price has worked its way through the
U.S. economy. Wages are lower there, but not enough to drive devel-
opment, and many of the dynamic young people move away. I see the
United States now in the same position that Jamestown was in fifty
years ago, and I see a high probability that in fifty more years, the
United States will be in the same position that Jamestown is in now,
with a moribund economy, limping along.
To understand my reasoning, one must understand three points
relevant to the question of why some areas benefit more from trade
than other areas.
First, production is best seen not as a single activity but as a multi-
layered process, and that trade generally occurs in only a portion of
that production process. For example, production can be divided into
resource extraction, manufacturing, planning and organization, re-
search and development, financial services, advertising, and distribu-
tion, among other areas. These various layers are tied together in
complicated ways. Trade generally does not involve the movement of
an entire production process. Instead it involves movement of some
sublevel of production. Technological developments in transporta-
tion, such as computerized container shipments, and in telecommu-
nications, such as the Internet, are allowing the processes to be divided
up more and more finely and are making an increasing portion of
the production process a tradable rather than a nontradable. As in-
creasing amounts of the production process become tradable, the
nature of nontransferable comparative advantages in production de-The Long-Run Consequences of Trade and Outsourcing
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creases and the pressure for factor price equalization increases.
This point is important because the effect of trade on a geographic
area depends on both its position in that multilayered process and
the percentage of the production process that is located in that geo-
graphic area. Over the past seventy-five years, many of the levels of
production have been based in the United States. In such an environ-
ment, trade benefits the United States enormously because the eco-
nomic activity it generates occurs there. Thus, for example, when the
United States outsourced resource extraction, or even manufactur-
ing, the large majority of the value added still accrued to U.S.-based
factors. When $60 Nike shoes are manufactured in China for $6, that
means, assuming all other aspects of production are in the United
States, that $54 of value-added production is generated in the United
States. The workers making shoes are hurt by such trade, but the United
States as a whole benefits strongly as the major benefits of the trade
accrue to the other levels of production. The more levels of produc-
tion in a country, the more trade helps that country.
Second, the development of production processes in a geographic
area requires enormous setup costs, which initially will significantly
slow the working of the law of one price. High setup costs tend to keep
production in geographic areas where it was initiated. The geographic
distribution of production has inertia that can only be overcome by
incurring setup costs. These costs, however, are one-time, not continual,
and, once incurred, they are no longer impediments to trade. Thus,
once the setup costs have been undertaken, the past experience with
trade may not be a good predictor of future experience.
Third, the benefits of trade in an area are equalized throughout
that geographic area and will spread to nontradables and geographi-
cally fixed factors of production. Nontradables, such as land, coun-
try-specific legal services, and country-specific support services, will
have much higher costs in areas that have benefited from trade in the
past than in other areas. Because these nontradables are inputs into
tradable goods, this means that the cost of production of tradables
will be higher in areas that have previously benefited from trade,
even when wages in the tradable sectors have equalized; slow adjust-Colander
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ment of these nontradable goods’ prices make quick factor price equal-
ization difficult. Part of the reason that a worker in China can cur-
rently exist on 60 cents an hour, whereas a worker in the  United
States would have a hard time existing on $8 an hour, is the differ-
ence in these nontradable costs. Only when wages and prices in the
nontradable sector  have equalized will tradable wages be fully able to
adjust. Because competition does not work directly on nontradable
sectors, that adjustment will take a long time.
Taking these three issues into account, I see the past experience of
the United States to be a poor predictor of the likely future U.S. expe-
rience with trade. The reasons are: (1) The proportion of production
processes in the United States is declining. As the proportion of pro-
duction related to trade in a geographical area declines, the positive
effects it gains from trade decline. (2) Setup costs have been incurred.
As the setup costs to develop production facilities elsewhere are in-
curred, the future gains from trade to a previously successful geo-
graphic area will be smaller. (3) Because of institutional rigidities of
prices of nontradables that do not experience the direct effect of glo-
bal competition, the prices of tradables in an area will be unlikely to
adjust fast enough, even with exchange-rate adjustments, to mitigate
the effects of the law of one price on output.
The United States still has some strong comparative advantages. It
has inertia, geographic, and resource advantages, a strong social and
political infrastructure, enormous wealth, and a population that still
controls much of the residual benefits of trade. So collapse is not
imminent, and we might even have some very positive years over the
next decade. But the law of one price will continue to chip away at
us. Technology is placing an increasing amount of production in play,
and as it does so, more and more areas in the United States will be
hurt by trade. As the proportion of production tied to the United
States continues to decrease, fewer of the residual gains from trade
will accrue to the United States. Rather than Nike shoes’ being split
10 percent to 90 percent, it will be 20 percent to 80 percent. As that
split continues to move against the United States, the benefit of trade
accruing to the United States will become smaller and smaller.The Long-Run Consequences of Trade and Outsourcing
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Eventually, the process will reach a tipping point, when the major-
ity of the benefits to trade will no longer be accruing to the United
States but to other countries. At that point we will see outsourcing turned
on the traders and the outsourcers themselves, and the United States will
experience a large sudden loss in benefits of trade. As the income from
those organizers of trade accrues to countries outside the United States,
the secondary benefits of trade will spill over to a larger degree in those
countries where the organizers of trade live. At that point, the United
States will no longer be the world economic leader.
As the process of adjustment occurs, the U.S. real exchange rate
will fall, and as it does, our competitiveness will improve. But with
wages of 60 cents in China and $12 here, and with the sheer size of
those Chinese, Indian, Bangladeshi, and similar workforces, the 25
percent fall in the value of the dollar that we have seen is only a small
portion of the fall that must take place before the pressure from the
law of one price will be abated. Over time, at current nominal wages
in China and India, the real exchange rate of the dollar would have to
fall something more like 60 percent to 80 percent if the underlying
process of job loss is going to be halted. An exchange rate adjustment
of that magnitude will cause serious structural problems in the United
States because it is not only real wages of those in the tradable sector
that must fall. It is also real wages of nontradables, such as legal ser-
vices and U.S.-specific financial accounting services. Many of these,
however, are structurally difficult to reduce, because of built-in legal
and social monopolies that protect them. Thus, I see the exchange
rate adjustment process leading to significant inequality and social
unrest. The problem is that globalization and exchange-rate move-
ments put unequal pressure on various sectors, and in doing so cre-
ate strife and undermine the social institutions upon which the fabric
of the U.S. economy is built. If they undermine that fabric, the stabil-
ity of the system is challenged and may be undermined.
All is not lost. A number of factors will continue to prop up the
U.S. economy in the short-term future. The first is the trading con-
vention that English is the language of business and academics. That
convention gives the United States what in my mind is its biggestColander
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comparative advantage at high-end jobs, and it will keep U.S. wages
above world average since it reduces competition at higher-level jobs
where subtle knowledge of language plays an important role. The
second is the legacy of past U.S. hegemony. U.S. citizens are the re-
sidual claimants of much of the production gains of trade—in terms
of patents, copyrights, and intellectual property rights. Residual claim-
ant income flows back to the United States, which means that it is
spent in the United States, creating jobs servicing those who get it.
Many of these jobs have been filled by immigration, which is another
way in which factor price equalization occurs. In fact, if one consid-
ers wages of U.S.-born workers, and not family income, wage income
over the last twenty years in the United States has been almost stag-
nant, just as the law of one price would have predicted.
As the outsourcing continues, the relative gains from trade accru-
ing to the United States will become relatively smaller. Eventually,
the outsourcing will occur at the management and “job-cutting
outsourcers” level. At that point, the outsourcers become outsourced,
and the residual claimants will geographically move, which means
that additional outsourcing will result in far less U.S. geographically
specific demand for services.
Once we get to the point where we are outsourcing the outsourcers,
the world economic power will shift out of the United States and
toward other countries such as China. At that point the equilibrium
value of the dollar will be far below where it is now, and U.S. relative
wages in tradables below other countries’ wages. The path to that equi-
librium is one in  which much of the United States languishes in slow
growth and economic malaise as the world economy grows.
Let me conclude by saying that my assessment of the long-run fu-
ture of the economy does not lead to protectionist arguments. The
law of one price is a powerful force. Tariffs and other protectionist
elements are too weak to stop it and will likely make its effects worse,
since those measures will prevent U.S. companies from competing
globally. These policies might make some short-run difference for
good or bad, but they will not make a long-run difference. It is like
putting your finger in one hole of a crumbling dike.The Long-Run Consequences of Trade and Outsourcing
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Instead, the policy conclusion I come to is that the United States
must prepare for the coming period of decline relative to the rest of
the world by increasing its competitiveness on all levels. We need to
break down internal monopolies that protect nontradable wages and
to add significantly more internal competition to the outsourcers
and traders. The United States must become leaner and meaner if it is
to remain competitive. If these areas do not increase their competi-
tiveness, the last remaining stronghold of the U.S. economy—the
outsourcing branch of the U.S. economy—will itself be outsourced,
as Chinese and other foreign firms with residual claimants outside
the United States replace current firms as the economic engines of
the world and the residual claimants of the benefits of trade.
What are the chances of such a pro-competitive policy? I suspect
close to nil, which is why I remain rather pessimistic about the long-
run future of the U.S. economy.
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